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Genomics and self-knowledge: implications for societal
research and debate
NIJMEGEN HUB ZWART
Centre for Society & Genomics, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT When the Human Genome Project (HGP) was launched, our genome was presented as
our ‘blueprint’, a metaphor reflecting a genetic deterministic epistemology. Eventually, however, the
HGP undermined rather than strengthened the understanding of genomes as blueprints and of genes
as ultimate causal units. A symbolical turning point was the discovery that the human genome only
contains 22,500 genes. Initially, this was seen as a narcissistic offence. Gradually, however, it
strengthened the shift from traditional genetics and biotechnology (i.e., gene-oriented approaches)
to genomics, i.e. genome-oriented or systems approaches, emphasizing complexity. The 20th
century can be regarded as the century of biotechnology and of the gene. Its history demonstrated
that the will to know (notably: to know ourselves) has never been a disinterested affair: it is driven
by a will to improve (notably: to improve ourselves). In this article it is claimed that, as genomics
takes us beyond a genetic deterministic understanding of life, this must have consequences for
societal research and debate as well. Policies for self-improvement will increasingly rely on the use of
complex interpretation. Therefore, the emphasis must shift from issues such as genetic manipulation
and human enhancement to issues involved in governance of novel forms of information.
Many tasks lie ahead if we are to learn how to speak
the language of the genome fluently. (Francis Collins, 26 June 2000)
We simply do not have enough genes for the idea
of genetic determinism to be right. (Craig Venter, 26 June 2000)
Introduction: self-knowledge 5 self-improvement
‘Know thyself’ was a famous admonition inscribed on Apollo’s temple at Delphi
in ancient Greece. Self-knowledge was regarded as the ultimate goal of all
knowledge-directed activities, but also as pivotal for gaining access to the world
around us. The Self was considered a microcosm, mirroring the world at large.
The ancient admonition was taken up by the neo-classicist poet Alexander
Pope (1688–1744) in a frequently cited section of his Essay on Man:
Know then thyself, presume not God to scan,
The proper study of mankind is man. (Pope, 1924/1959, p. 189)
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When on 26 June 2000, during their famous Press Conference at the White
House, Bill Clinton, Francis Collins and Craig Venter declared that the Human
Genome Project (HGP) was rapidly approaching its completion, Collins, as
director of the International Human Genome Sequencing consortium
(IHGSC), cited these very lines in his address. After a long journey of exploration,
we will finally be able to know and explore ourselves.1 He described the human
genome as ‘our own instruction book’ and as ‘the draft of the human book of
life’. Moreover, he expected that this tremendous progress in self-knowledge
would provide us with effective tools, indispensable for fighting diseases such as
cancer. Genomics would enable us to significantly improve the human condition.
This shift from knowledge to power is important. Our desire to understand
both ourselves and the world around us has never been a completely disinterested
affair. Even fundamental research programs are inspired by a Will to Power
(Nietzsche). This, at least, was the a priori conviction of philosophers such as
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) and Michel Foucault (1926–1984). Research
is oriented towards improvement and control. We are determined to acquire
knowledge with regard to something in order to gain power over it, to adapt it
and transform it. We want to know in order to master, change and ameliorate.
And this is particularly true when it comes to self-knowledge. We want to know
ourselves in order to master, modify, improve ourselves. Self-knowledge is
directed towards self-reform. In ancient Greece, Plato used mathematical
knowledge in order to produce a reformed type of human being. His dialogue Poli-
teia draws up the contours of a science-based curriculum encouraging the
improvement of individuals on the basis of ancient geometry (Plato, 1930/
1999; Jaeger, 1959). From a Nietzschean or Foucauldian perspective, the drive
towards self-improvement and self-control is what various socio-cultural
programs emerging in the course of centuries, varying from medieval Christian
asceticism to 20th-century social engineering (Skinner, 1948/1976), have in
common. And as science and technology evolve and self-knowledge deepens,
new tools for self-improvement are bound to emerge, much more powerful no
doubt that the type of science-based education recommended by Plato.
As the HGP came off ground, the 25-century-old quest for human self-
knowledge seemed to be entering a decisive stage. The human genome was
regarded by many as our ‘blueprint’.2 And it seemed logical to argue that once
we have unravelled and sequenced this blueprint, we will at last be able to
know ourselves. Moreover, if Nietzsche and Foucault were not mistaken, the
mapping of this ‘blueprint’ would provide us with new prospects for self-
mastery and self-modification. One of the authors adopting this line of thinking
was Peter Sloterdijk (1999). Starting with Plato, he describes human history as
a series of efforts towards self-amelioration. Initially, ‘soft’ techniques, notably
education (teaching people to read and write) were applied. This was part, Sloter-
dijk argued, of the humanistic program that had been an influential civilizing force
in human culture for many centuries. But now, in the genomics era, the high tide
of the life sciences, much more powerful tools (‘hard’ techniques) will become
available. Sloterdijk refers to them as anthropotechnologies and argues that we





































better start thinking about how to apply these technologies rather than claiming
that, in the name of ‘human dignity’, the development of such a repertoire
should not even be considered. Sooner or later, we will be forced to move
beyond the restricted strategies of traditional humanism. The logic behind his
argument is, once again, that remarkable progress in the field of knowledge will
inevitably be used to further our self-knowledge and will, eventually, and by
necessity fuel our desire to improve ourselves.
In this article I will argue that, although the human genome project (HGP) did
have a significant impact on our self-understanding, it turned out to be a different
one than was initially expected. TheHGPwas originally seen as the culmination of
what has been called ‘the century of the gene’ (Fox Keller, 2000). It was devoted to
mapping all the genes on the human genome—our blueprint or genetic program.
Yet, as the HGP and other genomics research activities progressed, the researchers
involved made a discovery that may be regarded as more or less inevitable—in the
sense of predictable: a standard event in the basic narrative of scientific inquiry,
namely, the recognition that the world is much more complex than was expected
at first, when the program initially set off. What I mean is that eventually, the HGP
has undermined rather than strengthened our understanding of the genome as our
blueprint and of genes as ultimate causal units. The belief in the existence of series
of more or less mono-causal relationships between genes and traits has lost much
of its credibility. TheHGP has forced researchers to thoroughly reconsider the role
and function (and indeed, even the ontological status) of our genes. The question I
will consider in this article is what the philosophical implications of this (more or
less unexpected) outcome must be for the way we see ourselves and think about
ourselves, notably when it comes to prospects for self-improvement. My conten-
tion will be that genomics research has acquired an epistemological profile sui
generis, fundamentally different from traditional genetics and biotechnology, and
that this calls for a completely different and revisited agenda for ethical and societal
debate in comparison to what was initially envisioned.Whereas a good deal of con-
temporary societal debate is still framed in the language of the 1990s, genomics
research forces us to address new challenges and to really move the debate into
the 21st century.
The century of the gene: between parentheses
The ‘century of the gene’ started in 1900 with the rediscovery of the work of Gregor
Mendel (1822–1884). Some years later the term ‘genetics’ was introduced, and in
1953, around the middle of the century, Watson and Crick discovered the structure
ofDNA. Finally, in 2000, it was proudly and officially announced that theHGPwas
rapidly approaching its completion. These are the cardinal points, the markers so to
speak of the gene-century. The rediscovery ofMendel’s work and the (almost) com-
pletion of the HGP are its parentheses. Furthermore, the claim of Nietzsche and
Foucault that knowledge is directed towards self-knowledge and, eventually,
towards self-control seems to be confirmed by the history of genetics. Almost
from the very outset, geneticists began to think about possibilities for applying





































Mendel’s laws to human beings.3 The exact relationship between genetics research
and the (real or envisioned) applications to mankind is, of course, a highly compli-
cated and controversial one. The eugenics movement of the first half of the 20th
century has gained a highly problematic political reputation, to put it mildly, and
not undeservedly. Eugenics has become a term of abuse and researchers involved
in recent developments such as ‘community genetics’ exert themselves to emphasise
the extent to which their research endeavours differ from traditional eugenics—the
basic difference being that whereas (in terms of policy) eugenics focussed predomi-
nantly on ‘top down’ interventions by governmental bodies and state authorities,
the focus of community genetics and public health genomics will be on empowering
individuals to make their own choices (‘bottom up’). Yet, the shadow of eugenics is
still clearly noticeable.
An impressive recent analysis of the intricate relationship between genetics and
eugenics is Simon Mawer’s book (half biography, half novel) on Mendel (Mawer,
1998). On the one hand, it is a story about a molecular biologist who suffers from
achondroplasia (dwarfism), a monogenetic (autosomal dominant) genetic
‘defect’. His life’s work is devoted to discovering the ‘gene that caused him’
and, eventually, to developing the tools that will allow mankind to cleanse the
gene pool of this defect (that is, his research objective is basically the extermina-
tion of dwarfism, of individuals like himself). Yet, fictional accounts of the vicissi-
tudes of this bizarre molecular biologist alternate with biographical descriptions of
and reflections onMendel’s life and work. The novel is an acute analysis of, but at
the same time a critical reflection on, the idea that we are our genes—that is,
genetic determinism.
Throughout the 20th century, from the rediscovery of Mendel’s work via the
discovery of the structure of DNA up to the launching of the HGP, the determi-
nistic idea that we are our genes has been a recurrent theme. It is, so to speak, an
important element in the ‘score’ of this century of the gene. Yet, it has always been
contested, mitigated and counter-pointed. Indeed the nature-nurture controversy
has been one of the major ideological and scientific quandaries of the 20th
century, and if we say that the 20th century was the century of the gene, we
should not take this in the sense that genetic determinism was its dominant
creed, but rather in the sense that in the context of the nature-nurture controversy,
‘nature’ became more or less identical with ‘genes’. Ironically, however, it was the
fate of the HGP to undermine rather than confirm the idea that we are our genes.
But before addressing this issue in more detail, it must be emphasized that the
20th century was not only the century of the gene, but also of biotechnology. In
its final decades, a powerful synthesis came about between biotechnology and
genetics. Genomics research (as a successor to traditional genetics) was initially
expected to consolidate this synthesis.
The century of biotechnology
Around 1900, biologist Jacques Loeb (1859–1924) voiced the idea that nature
must be regarded as raw material, to be modified and improved by biological





































engineers (Pauly, 1987). Biology’s core objective, Loeb said, is the improvement
of nature. Why accept existing biological constraints as given? Why not use bio-
logical knowledge in order to improve life and—eventually—ourselves, much
more directly and effectively than we have done so far? Why not prolong the
human life-span or opt for artificial instead of sexual reproduction? These
ideas, articulated in interviews in magazines were futuristic extrapolations of his
research with model organisms such as sea urchins. By manipulating the chemical
composition of their environment, Loeb managed to induce ‘artificial partheno-
genesis’ (non-sexual reproduction) and concluded that, in the end, artificial
reproduction in ‘mammals’ (i.e., humans) would be possible as well. Children
born without male involvement would free future women from the necessity of
associating themselves with men in order to become mothers. Although in the
context of his experiments the actual power of science over nature was still
rather limited, the ideological framing of his research (and the recognition of its
potential impact for society) was clear enough. The famous first chapter of
Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, describing the ‘Central London Hatchery
and Conditioning Centre’, consciously echoes Loeb’s ideas. Huxley’s novel is a
classic effort to describe the atmosphere of discontent that biotechnology
incited in broad circles. The first chapter describes how the chemical environ-
ments of embryo’s kept in vitro are systematically manipulated in order to
adapt them to societal demands and the chapter actually contains some references
to Loeb’s views.4 The basic goal of biotechnology was clear—evidence-based
amelioration of human nature: (self-) knowledge is power.
The same biotechnological impetus was apparent in the work of other biotech-
nologists, such as Hermann Joseph Muller (1890–1967). Building on his labora-
tory research (exposure of fruit flies to radiation in order to inflict, and study the
effects of, mutations) he envisioned a program for the improvement of the human
species. In the 1930s he even went to the Soviet Union where a large-scale political
program for improvement of human beings had been launched and where he
offered his ideas. The advent of Lyssenkoism, however, hampered genetic
research in Russia. Communists regarded genetics as a reactionary science, as it
predicted the re-emergence in future generations of undesirable traits that politi-
cal regimes set out to suppress. Lyssenko’s ideas were more in tune with commun-
ism, focused on the manipulation of environmental factors such as: exposure (of
plant forms, but this could also apply to human beings) to extreme conditions, for
example, cold. Muller and Lyssenko shared the basic belief that biotechnology
will provide us with powerful tools for improvement and, eventually, for self-
improvement. Yet their actual research results were not at all sufficient to
support these grand societal claims. Biotechnological research as it had evolved
so far did not really give them the tools that would allow them to realize their
visions.
When in the 1970s the biotechnological revolution finally took place, and tools
for effective manipulation of species became available, the socio-political land-
scape had dramatically changed. Totalitarian regimes that had nourished
dreams about science-based improvement of the masses and the people, had





































given way to much more open societies, where the setting for biotechnology had
altered from top-down and large-scale manipulation (as envisioned by Huxley,
Lyssenko and others) to bottom-up strategies for empowerment of individuals.
Although some of the technologies announced in Brave New World really
became available (notably IVF), they were not used for grand programs in the
context of ‘biopolitics’ (mass improvement) but rather for allowing individuals
to solve their personal problems (such as childlessness). Moreover, biotechnology
(notably in the context of improving crops and livestock) had now unequivocally
shifted its focus of attention from manipulating environments to manipulating
genes: the ‘wedding’ of biotechnology and genetics (Bud, 1993, pp. 163ff.).
As biotechnology really became powerful, during the final decades of the 20th
century, it incited a considerable amount of societal uneasiness and discontent.
Critics considered Western societies as much less open and individuals as much
less autonomous and free to choose than proponents of biotechnology suggested.
New biotechnologies were seen as potential threats to reproductive autonomy and
the environment. In public debates over biotechnology, references to ‘brave new
world’ frequently arose. Whereas scientists emphasized the societal prospects and
promises of biotechnology (fighting hunger, improving health, generating econ-
omical benefits) there was a substantial amount of hesitance towards, or even
downright rejection of, biotechnological products among the public, especially
in European countries. Indeed, the late 1990s have been described as the ‘years
of controversy’ (Gaskell & Bauer, 2001). Two events, the announcement by
Jacques Loeb at the beginning of the century and the growing resistance
towards biotechnology during its final decade are the parentheses, so to speak,
of the ‘century of biotechnology’.
These two story lines (the synthesis of genetics and biotechnology on the one
hand and the controversies this synthesis incited on the other) set the scene for
the launching of the HGP. As flagship project of genomics research, but in
close connection with other efforts to sequence the genomes of ‘model organisms’
(Drosophila melanogaster, C-Elegans, the laboratory mouse), the HGP would
constitute the final act. The wedding would come to fruition, as new and powerful
tools for biotechnology would finally become available. New prospects would be
opened up for knowledge (including self-knowledge) and amelioration.
The subsequent debate over the societal impacts of genomics developed
in several directions. On the one hand, the genomics researchers themselves in
their societal communications tended to focus on short-term benefits and moder-
ate goals such as crop improvement, the production of healthier foods and better
medicines as well as the fight against hereditary disease. Others, however, notably
novelists and philosophers, went a step further. Peter Sloterdijk’s announcement
of the advent of anthropotechnologies was already mentioned. Another voice
deserving to be mentioned here is Michel Houellebecq (1998) whose novel
Elementary Particles aroused much response. While criticizing technologies of
the self that individuals experimented with in the 1960s, such as drug use and
sexual liberation, he propagated the idea that now, at the turn of the millennium,
we are really entering a new era, in which much more powerful and science-based





































technologies will become available for self-improvement, leading us far beyond
humanity as it had developed so far, on the basis of evolution and history.
Although not many details are given in terms of exactly how this self-transform-
ation, this leap into post-humanism will be achieved, the message is nonetheless
clear enough.
Another line of thinking belonging to this trend has baptized itself ‘transhuman-
ism’ (see,http://www.nickbostrom.com/.). The objective is to set the stage for
genetic enhancement, not by fighting monogenetic defects, but rather by using
genomics to achieve positive intellectual enhancement (learning capacity, alert-
ness, creativity, intelligence, social cognition, empathy, etc.). Opponents to this
idea (and this includes authors such as Leon Kass (2002), Francis Fukuyama
(2002) and Jürgen Habermas (2003)) are dismissed as ‘bio-conservationists’.
It is the objective of this article to point out that this line of thinking, however
intriguing or disquieting as a thought experiment, is actually mistaken and misguid-
ing in a rather fundamental way. Genomics research is neither about fighting
monogenetic health problems nor about cognitive enhancement through anthro-
pobiotechnologies. In order to really address the ethical and societal challenges
involved in genomics research, we must first of all try to define its epistemological
profile much more precisely. Genomics is not about modifying organisms, nor
about finding the genes that will enable us to improve ourselves, but rather
about understanding and managing massive files of information concerning
complex processes and interactions. And once we realize this, it must affect the
framing of our agenda for philosophical and societal debate. Grand ideas about
genetic enhancement of humanity as such have more or less become outdated
by the way genomics research has actually developed. However futuristic these
ideas may sound, in terms of their basic premises they are actually still part of
the mindset of the 20th century. The real challenges of genomics research will
have to be framed in a rather different manner. It will not take us beyond humanity
(for the time being at least), but it will take us beyond the ideals and discontents of
biotechnology and genetic modification as envisioned during the final decades of
the 20th century. Genomics research in general and the HGP in particular did not
have the outcome they were initially expected to have. It is time to revisit our
societal agenda and to go beyond the clichés of the biotechnology debate as it
evolved in the 1990s. We will not enter a post-human era, but we will be con-
fronted with a situation that is, in important respects, without precedent—and
for which we better prepare ourselves.
The Human Genome Project
On February 2001, the International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium
(directed by Collins) in collaboration with its competitor (Celera Genomics,
directed by Craig Venter) published ‘working drafts’ of the sequence of the
human genome in Nature (IHGSC, 2001)and Science (Venter et al., 2001). In
the opening lines of the IHGSC article, the HGP is presented as the completion
of the century of the gene: ‘The rediscovery of Mendel’s laws of heredity in the





































opening weeks of the 20th century sparked a scientific quest to understand the
nature and content of genetic information that has propelled biology for the last
hundred years’ (IHGSC, 2001, p. 860). This perspective is taken up again in
the concluding section: ‘The Human Genome Project is but the latest increment
in a remarkable scientific program whose origins stretch back a hundred years to
the rediscovery ofMendel’s laws and whose end is nowhere in sight’ (ibid., p. 914).
These quotes put the century between its proper parentheses. During the last
quarter of the century, moreover, the focus had shifted from deciphering genes
to sequencing genomes, from a focus on single genes to a willingness to take a
‘comprehensive’ or genome-oriented view (ibid., p. 862). The challenge from
now on would be to transform information into understanding (ibid., p. 914).
Indeed, the HGP is presented as a turning point: the completion of the 20th
century and the beginning of the 21st. Now that the human genome has been
sequenced (‘structural genomics’), the emphasis will shift to understanding the
intricate complexities of gene function (‘functional genomics’). In other words,
the HGP is not a conclusion, but rather a starting point for future research of a
completely different type.
The HGP was launched in 1988, with James Watson as its first director,
although the formal initiation took place on 1 October 1990. The ultimate
goal was to compile a complete list of all human genes, a ‘periodic table’ for bio-
medical inquiries (IHGSC, 2001, p. 892). In 2000, while announcing that
the HGP was approaching its completion, Clinton stated that he regarded the
genome as a kind of map while Blair (via satellite) referred to it as ‘the
working blueprint of the human race’. It was heralded as ‘the first great techno-
logical triumph of the 21st century’. Clinton and Collins also indicated that the
knowledge generated by the HGP will give us immense power. What more
powerful form of self-knowledge can there be than the ability to read ‘our own
instruction book’?
From a philosophical perspective, the HGP raises a whole series of interesting
questions, ranging from the issue of commercialization to the meaning of author-
ship in the genomics era. While the Nature publication of Watson and Crick had
been a two-author article, IHGSC’s article listed 249 authors and Venter’s publi-
cation 285. Clinton and Blair emphasized the importance of both collaboration
and competition. James Watson (1968) had already described science as compe-
tition between rivaling teams, and the HGP has been described as a ‘Genome
War’ by James Shreeve (2004), a metaphor that reflects the tremendous increase
in scale, for while the structure of DNA was discovered by two researchers,
engrossed in an unofficial research quest (more or less dropping out from their
official research assignments), the HGP was a large-scale, multi-centre, multi-
national, acutely managed research program. It was a competition moreover
between two styles of research, in terms of methodology (the more conservative
‘hierarchical’ versus the controversial ‘whole-genome’ shotgun approach) and
funding (public versus private funding). Eventually, however, both teams came
to regard one another as ‘complementary’ (see ,http://www.genome.gov/
10001356.).





































Thus, while the HGP can be looked at in various ways, I will focus on one
aspect only, namely, the fact that in the course of the HGP, something remarkable
has happened. Initially, estimates of the number of genes on the human genome
tended to vary greatly. Figures ranging from 80,000 to 200,000 genes were given.
Walter Gilbert (1992) had suggested that the human genome contained some-
thing like 100,000 genes. The ‘pleasing roundness’ of the figure apparently led
to it being widely quoted and adopted (IHGSC, 2001, p. 898). James Watson
(2002) had mentioned 248,000 genes as a probable figure. In 2000, an estimate
of 120,000 genes was still proposed (Liang et al., 2000), but more modest
estimates (40,000 genes) were also circulating. In 2001, IHGSC’s official estimate
was reduced to31,000 genes. But in 2004, in the landmark paper that described
and discussed the finished version (‘build 35’), covering 99% of the human
genome, a more or less final estimate was given (IHGSC, 2004). Apparently,
the human genome contains  22,500 genes. Gert-Jan van Ommen (2005,
p. 931) stated that this finished version will serve as a ‘firm foundation for biome-
dical research in the decades ahead’, a robust resource for future research. He was
somewhat astonished by the fact that in this ‘final’ paper the human gene count
was corrected to an estimate of 22,500.5 This was something of a disappointment
indeed, not only in comparison to previous (and intuitively more convincing)
estimates, but also in comparison to the number of genes on the genomes of
other model organisms such as Drosophila melanogaster (14,000 genes),
Caenorhabditis elegans (19,000 genes) and Arabidopsis thaliana (25,000
genes). Van Ommen (2005, p. 931) remarks: ‘one almost wonders what . . . does
set us apart from flies and worms’.
In its own comment the Consortium agrees that the number of genes is modest
(‘only about twice as many as in worm or fly’, IHGSC, 2004, p. 860), but this is
explained by saying that human genes are ‘more complex, with more alternative
splicing generating a larger number of protein products’ (IHGSC, 2004,
p. 860). Yet, ambivalence is clearly noticeable. On the one hand it is said that,
in various ways, genome characteristics (size, number of genes, tRNA genes,
etc.) do not seem to correlate well with ‘organismal complexity’. On the other
hand, the authors remain inclined to stress, for a variety of reasons, the uniqueness
of the human genome: standing ‘in stark contrast to the genome of other organ-
isms’ (IHGSC, 2004, p. 882). Mere gene number does not confirm this. The
number of genes remains something of a surprise—counter-intuitive, at least.
The surprisingly small number raises an intriguing philosophical question: how
can the genome of an organism able to create a highly complex, artificial environ-
ment, a technological world, a ‘technotope’, contain such a small number of
genes? While we are exploring and unravelling the structure of the universe and
reshaping our environment at an unprecedented scale and pace, the genetic
basis for our unique talents and creativity remains unclear. On the level of our
genome, we do not seem that different at all. Our uniqueness and otherness is
not reflected by our genes, at least in terms of number.
This astonishment may give rise to at least three different lines of argument.
The first one can be referred to as ‘replacement’. Complexity must be there,





































but we must look for it elsewhere, for example in the remarkable functional
plasticity of human genes. Complexity is not a matter of quantity, but rather of
intensity, of intricate pathways. This is the position taken by the Consortium,
and seems to be the dominant trend among life scientists in general.
The second line of argument can be referred to as ‘disenchantment’. Apparently,
we are not that different after all. As Venter (http://www.genome.gov/10001356)
phrased it during his White House speech: ‘We . . . have many genes in common
with every species on Earth . . . we’re not so different from one another. You may
be surprised to learn that your sequences are greater than 90 percent identical to pro-
teins in other animals . . .’. Indeed, the HGP simply confronts us with yet another
‘narcistic offence’. As Sigmund Freud (1917/1947) explained in his famous essay,
scientific research inevitably confronts us with findings (such as Copernican
heliocentrism and Darwinian evolution) that challenge our belief that we are
somehow different. One could add that after Copernicus and Darwin, science has
continued to generate narcistic offences of various kinds. The HGP is simply
another proof of the vulnerability of our narcistic overestimation (Vollmer, 1992).
A third strategy, the one I will subscribe to in this paper, can be referred to as
‘reframing’. If we look at the HGP more carefully (take a ‘second look’), our
complexity, the idea that we are somehow unique, is confirmed rather than
denied. From a philosophical point of view, the ‘disenchantment’ argument is
not wholly convincing. Of course we must remain alert to narcistic biases in
our self-image. And undoubtedly, biological research has demonstrated that, as
biological organisms, we are not that different. Nonetheless, it is clear that we
have introduced something without precedent: a technological culture that
allows us to inhabit a world of our own making. No other organisms have
engaged in such activities (or only in rudimentary ways). No other organisms
have addressed issues such as heliocentrism, evolution or genomes. Indeed, no
other organism ‘has sequenced its own genome!’ (Collins, 2006, p. 125). No
other species could even consider such a possibility. Due to our remarkable
openness to the world, we are the only living beings that are able to offend them-
selves, to challenge appearances—even their own self-image. Although there is
continuity (on the biological level) between us and other species, there is (on
the cultural level) an evident gap as well. And still, apparently, we do not find
our remarkable creativity and intelligence reflected in our genome.
In a famous article in the New York Times, Stephen Jay Gould (2001) also
addressed this issue. According to Gould, the HGP’s final result, in terms of
gene number, was not disappointing, but reassuring. It changed the way we
think about our genome in relationship to ourselves. Initially, the HGP project
was seen as the final confirmation of genetic determinism and of its logical
counterpart, genetic reductionism. Both research strategies were moved by the
desire to discover mono-causal relationships between genes and traits. Genetic
determinism claims that single genes determine discrete traits and, pushed to
its extreme, the basic objective of genetics is to discover a gene for every possible
trait. Genetic reductionism, on the other hand, works the other way around, but
on the basis of the same belief: there must be a gene to every trait we are interested





































in. Initially, the HGP was regarded as the culmination of this line of thinking. It
was seen by many as ‘the culmination of the reductionist approach characteristic
of molecular biology’ (Vicedo, 1992). According to Gould, however, writing in
2001 and reflecting on an estimate of  30,000 genes in the human genome,
this has now become impossible. The HGP makes clear that human complexity
cannot be generated by 30,000 genes (let alone 22,500 genes). The HGP has
undermined ‘the old view of life embodied in what geneticists literally called
(admittedly with a sense of whimsy) their ‘central dogma’: DNA makes RNA
makes protein—in other words, one direction of causal flow from code to
message to assembly of substance, with one item of code (a gene) ultimately
making one item of substance (a protein), and the congeries of proteins making
a body’. According to Gould, the collapse of the doctrine of one gene for one
protein, and of one direction of causal flow from basic codes to species character-
istics, marks the failure of reductionism for biology. He writes: ‘Biomedical
research over the past decade has been dominated by a genetic determinist under-
standing of disease and the discredited doctrine of “one gene, one protein”.
One thing the human gene map does tell us is that there are ten times as many
proteins as genes. Genetic determinism is dead’ (Gould, 2001). The HGP has
frustrated the intuitive assumption that there must be a relationship somehow
between organismal complexity and gene number. It seems impossible that
22,500 genes are enough to package all the information needed to become a
human being.
This issue is also taken up by Adam Wilkins in an editorial comment in Bio-
Essays. He points out that the human genome project has ‘not only been a story
of massive technological innovation and high scientific accomplishment but also
a history of grand pronouncements’ (Wilkins, 2001, p. 561). As the sequencing
process nears completion, hyperbole gives way to more realistic statements and
this clearly also pertains to the decreasing estimates of gene number. Wilkins is
critical of a statement made by Craig Venter saying that the surprisingly low
gene number shows that we are ‘not a product of our genes’ and that ‘the wonder-
ful diversity of the human species is not hard-wired in our genetic code—our
environments are crucial’ (Venter, 2001, p. 1). In his comment, Wilkins empha-
sizes that this is, of course, a simplification. We should not address this issue in
terms of either/or. He agrees that to a certain extent the belief in genetic deter-
minism belongs to the past and that the HGP has contributed to this develop-
ment. Reported identifications of single genes for traits such as criminality and
gender preference have lost much of their former credibility. Downstream
causal flow from gene to trait is much more complicated that genetic determinism
was willing to accept. The trajectories from genetic information to behaviour
involve ‘intricate and complex chains of events’. Quite a range of different pro-
ducts can emerge from one single gene. Hence, simply knowing the gene
number of an organism is not a measure of complexity. The nature-nurture
dichotomy that was so influential in scholarly and political debate in the 20th
century has become grossly outmoded. We have finally moved beyond this dichot-
omy, this either/or.





































Thus the impact of the HGP is the reverse of what was originally expected. In
1992, as the project was in its early stages, Gilbert suggested that the HGP would
lead to ‘a change in our philosophical understanding of ourselves’. Indeed, ‘to
recognize that we are determined. . .by a finite collection of knowledge that is
knowable will change our view of ourselves. It is a closing of an intellectual frontier
with which we will have to come to terms. Over the next ten years [we will under-
stand deeply how we are] dictated by our genetic information’ (Gilbert, 1992,
p. 96). We now know that things have taken a different turn. The HGP has
rather been the opening up of frontiers. It has taken us beyond genetic determinism.
Yet, terms like determinism and reductionism, used somewhat loosely perhaps in
this section, are complicated and highly controversial, especially in philosophical
circles. In order to put this discussion in its proper perspective, we must therefore
consider the concepts of ‘genetic determinism’ and ‘genetic reductionism’ in
some more detail.
Beyond reductionism? On defining genomics
A strong initial motivation for the HGP was to relate biological features to the
structure and function of small sets of genes or, ideally, to individual genes
(Gierer, 2002, p. 25). Gradually, however, this reductionist approach gave way
to a ‘systems’ approach emphasizing the interplay of large numbers of genes,
and the involvement of complex networks of gene regulation. According to
Gierer, contemporary genomics research may even be called ‘holistic’, if the
term is not used in a pejorative sense. Indeed, the history of biology can be
seen as a chronic struggle, an oscillation between reductionism and holism.
And genomics, although initially inspired by a more or less reductionist style of
thinking, has shifted the emphasis again towards ‘holism’. Most aspects of
human life cannot be explained in terms of monogenetic causation. The typical
bottom-up approach of molecular biology is not sufficient, a top-down, holistic
or systems approach is indispensable.
But what exactly do we mean by concepts like ‘reductionism’ and ‘determin-
ism’? In the context of the life sciences, reductionism may mean a variety of
things. At least three basic definitions of the term can be distinguished, namely:
ontological, epistemological and pragmatic reductionism. Ontological reduction-
ism is the belief that all phenomena in nature can ultimately be reduced to a
limited number of causal units (for example genes, or—ideally—elementary par-
ticles). These primal causal units are regarded as determinants of everything else.
Epistemological reductionism is the belief that eventually all forms of knowledge
can ultimately be reduced to knowledge claims belonging to one basic discipline.
In the context of biology, epistemological reductionism would be the belief that
eventually all biological knowledge claims can be reduced to or translated in
terms of genetics. Both ontological and epistemological reductionisms are philo-
sophical positions: guiding ideas or a priori convictions. In principle they cannot
be empirically proven.





































Pragmatic reductionism is different. It does not contain grand ontological
claims about nature as such, but basically says that, although the real world is
no doubt tremendously complex, it will be difficult if not impossible to do
justice to this complexity in the context of laboratory research. In order to under-
stand a particular phenomenon, the relationships between a limited number of
determining factors will have to be studied. Not because scientists believe that
this is all, or that everything is determined by (or can be explained on the basis
of) a limited set of mono-causal relationships, but simply because the number
of factors that can be meaningfully studied in a laboratory setting is limited.
Once the relationships between these factors have been established, researchers
will try to extrapolate their research finding to the real world, in the expectation
that, out there, things will prove much more complicated. In other words, reduc-
tionism is a methodological requirement. It is basically a (highly successful, but
from a philosophical perspective rather problematic) research strategy.
The idea behind genomics, however, is that this may no longer be the case.
Because of completely new research tools that have become available (high
throughput analysis, bioinformatics, computational biology, micro-array
research) it has become possible to study and analyze complex relationships
within a laboratory setting. Genomics allows us to simultaneously study the func-
tion of all the genes on the genome of an organism, in interaction with its environ-
ment. In other words, whereas traditional genetics was about a limited number of
genes, genomics is about a whole genome comprehensively. And whereas biotech-
nology was about transferring or deleting single genes (genetic modification),
genomics will focus on understanding complex systems.
The conceptual counterpart of reductionism is the term ‘complexity’, a key
word in contemporary genomics research (as well as in many other contemporary
research areas). What is complexity? Nobel Prize winner Murray Gell-Mann
(1929–), famous for his discovery of the quarck, has argued that complex
systems cannot be seen as determined by the behaviour of elementary particles.
In his book The Quarck and the Jaguar, he writes: ‘The laws of biology do
depend on the laws of physics and chemistry, but they also depend on a vast
amount of additional information. The science of biology is very much more
complex than fundamental physics. . . (Gell-Mann, 1994, p. 115). Although
physics and chemistry are evidently important, eventually complex living
systems have to be studied on their own level of complexity. Moreover, complexity
does not simply mean that things are very ‘complicated’ in the sense that
many factors are involved. Rather, complex systems are ‘systems that display
properties that are not predictable from a complete description of their com-
ponents, and that are generally considered to be qualitatively different from the
sum of their parts’.6
In framing a definition for genomics, the term complexity can hardly be absent.
But what exactly is genomics? In editorials commenting on the publication of the
‘working drafts’ in 2001, genomics is ‘the beginning of a new approach in
biology’7 and a ‘fundamental advance in self-knowledge’?8 To what extent and
in what way is genomics really ‘new’?





































The question ‘What is genomics?’ is not at all a trivial one (Delsi, 1988;
Harris & Buckler, 1997). Different and often incompatible answers have been
given by various experts. And the way we answer this question will have conse-
quences for the way we think about our genome, as well as for the ways in
which the debate over the societal aspects of genomics will have to be framed.
The term genome was first used by H. Winkler in 1920,9 but the neologism ‘geno-
mics’ is of a muchmore recent date. It was coined in 1986 by Thomas Roderick as
the title of a new journal and as a name for what is nowadays regarded as structural
genomics: mapping or sequencing the genomes of model species. The editorial
inaugurating the journal Genomics in 1 September 1987 was entitled, ‘Genomics:
A New Discipline, a New Name, a New Journal’. Although the genome was
regarded as a blueprint, it was clear or course that sequencing a genome will not
immediately tell us what the functions of particular genes are. Therefore, the
focus of genomics was bound to shift sooner or later from structural to functional
genomics. Whereas structural genomics can be seen as a continuation of genetics
in the sense that it is still about detecting and locating genes, functional genomics is
different in that it has taken a global, genome-wide or systems approach (Hieter &
Boguski, 1997, p. 601). It is characterized by high throughput or large-scale exper-
imental methodologies combined with computational analysis of data. Genomics
is a converging field where genetics, molecular biology and bioinformatics come
together and the DNA Micro-array is its basic tool, its basic symbol. It expands
the scope of biological investigation from studying single genes to studying ‘all
genes . . . at once in a systematic fashion’ (Hieter & Boguski, 1997, p. 601). In
the context of this shift from genes to genomes it became clear that in order to under-
stand the function of genes, a mono-causal, reductionist approach is not very
helpful. Functional genomics gradually moved into the practice of analyzing the
interactions of large numbers of genetic and environmental factors. In other
words, there was a shift from ‘genetic determinism’ (we are our genes) to ‘under-
standing complexity’ (studying complex interactions between ‘nature’ and
‘nurture’).
The philosopher John Dupré (2004) in a recent article also stresses the newness
of genomics in comparison to its predecessor, 20th-century genetics. The epistem-
ology of genomics is different. In the context of genomics, it has even become ques-
tionable whether the ‘gene’ is a meaningful concept at all. According to Dupré,
the genome does not seem to contain anything that corresponds to traditional
conceptions of genes. Despite its historical development out of genetics, genomics
represents ‘a radically different kind of scientific project’ (Dupré, 2004, p. 320). It
has undermined the ontological status of the gene, a construct that has lost much
of its former usability and credibility. It may even become obsolete. Although we
still talk about genes, and although through mass media we still learn with con-
siderable regularity that scientists ‘discover’ genes, genomics forces us to reconsi-
der the meaning of this concept. According to Dupré, the fact that in
contemporary discourse ‘genetics’ is being replaced with ‘genomics’ is not
merely a rhetorical move. The genome is completely at odds with a ‘reductionist
epistemology’ that has been rendered obsolete (ibid., p. 336).





































The shift from a traditional monogenetic to a multi-factorial orientation is also
apparent on the level of applied research. The reductionist approach was (and will
continue to be) useful for studying traditional monogenetic health problems, such
as Huntington’s Disease or particular forms of cancer. Most human health pro-
blems, however, are multi-factorial. They are the emergent outcome of complex
interactions between genetic and environmental factors, between (genetic) consti-
tution and life style. Therefore, genomics has been regarded as a ‘quantum leap in
the life sciences’ (van Ommen, 2002). In the genomics era it no longer seems
viable to hunt for an ‘intelligence gene’ (IGF2R on Chromosome 6) or an ‘aggres-
sion gene’ (Pet-1).
The shift from genes to genomics, from ‘genetic determinism’ to ‘understand-
ing complex systems’ is apparent in other areas as well, such as plant genomics.
The difference between plant genomics and biotechnology is that genomics does
not focus on genetic modification of organisms (gene transfer). Rather its basic
objective is to understand and make more intelligent use of complex systems, to
interact with them in a more intelligent and informed way. The same goes for a
newly emerging, converging field called ecogenomics,10 aimed at understanding
the metagenome of the soil, which comprises the genomes of all soil organisms.
A systems approach is vital for understanding complex soil properties such as
fertility and resilience. It will support a more sustainable use of soil, interacting
with nature more carefully and intelligently. In all these examples the claim is
made that genomics, in comparison with ‘traditional’ biotechnology, has an
epistemological profile sui generis. However, to the extent that knowledge is
power, and to the extent that the will to understand is driven by a will to
improve, one may also argue that this distinction between classical genetics
and biotechnology on the one hand and genomics on the other is relative in
the sense that, in the context of applications (for example in agriculture), the
difference may blur. How questionable and/or rhetorical is the newness of
genomics?
Definition politics
The claim elaborated in the previous section that genomics is really something
‘new’, differing significantly in terms of epistemological profile from traditional
genetics and biotechnology, is highly controversial. Skeptics point out that actu-
ally, there is much continuity between these research practices. Although technol-
ogies for doing laboratory research have changed, the basic mind-set remained the
same. Genomics is considered a buzzword, introduced for strategic reasons (in
order to ensure massive funding, or in order to forego unfavorable associations
with genetic manipulation in the public realm). Rather than moving beyond
genetic determinism, genomics will eventually reinforce a deterministic view.
This is a common line of argument among critics: genomics will eventually
strengthen ‘geneticalisation’. Instances of ‘genomics news’ (announcements of
research results in public media) continue to focus on genes as ultimate causal
constituents.





































In the case of pharmacogenomics, for example, Hedgecoe (2003, p. 514) has
argued that it must not be seen as a term representing a new area of research,
but rather as ‘a rhetorical device used to gain support among policy makers
and funders for particular research topics and technologies’. Genomics is a
dubious neologism, a label for what is actually a ‘hype’. According to Hedgecoe,
there is no real difference between pharmacogenetics and pharmacogenomics.
Both study the impact of genetic differences that affect drug metabolisms (in
terms of effectiveness and side-effects). He concludes that ‘rather than represent-
ing a distinct research discipline, the term pharmacogenomics is a rhetorical
strategy used to enlist support through association with the word genomics’
(ibid., p. 528).
I find this argument not convincing. Although it is certainly possible to indicate
various continuities between pharmacogenoetics and pharmacogenomics, the
basic epistemological difference as it was fleshed out above is nonetheless
obvious, also in this case. Whereas pharmacogenetics relies on detecting single
candidate genes, the emphasis in pharmacogenomics will be genome-oriented
(interactions between large numbers of genes). As a subfield within genomics, it
confirms the shift from a monogenetic to a more holistic approach, discussed
above. Of course, these are ‘ideal types’ in the Weberian sense, and in concrete
instances the theoretical distinction may well be less clear. And of course, research
teams involved in pharmacogenetics will sometimes, for strategic reasons, unde-
servedly claim that they are involved in pharmacogenomics, thus adding to the
confusion. Although these problems are real enough, it does not imply that the
distinction as such is completely rhetorical. Although rhetoric undoubtedly plays
a role, this should not divert our attention from what is, epistemologically speak-
ing, the key issue here. I agree with Hedgecoe that genomics is strictly speaking
not a new discipline or field. Rather, ‘genomics’ points to an epistemological
shift within a number of disciplines or research fields: from a monogenetic to a
(comprehensive) genomics orientation. A new style of research is introduced,
based on new tools but also involving a different mind-set.
Reductionism and complexity in Jurassic Park
The shift from genetics to genomics is also reflected in one of the most important
literary reflections on genomics, namely Michael Crichton’s (1991) novel Jurassic
Park. In this highly successful science novel, a company called InGen developed a
sophisticated genetic engineering facility on an island in Central American where
regulation is absent. A team of researchers was hired for setting up a theme park in
a resort—a private Jurassic zoo of large dimensions. They achieve this by remaking
Jurassic dinosaurs with the help of supercomputers using paleo-DNA extracted
from blood preserved within mosquitoes entombed in fossil amber. The Jurassic
animals, whose ecology has vanished, are introduced into an environment as
‘Jurassic’ as possible: a tropical forest area. Thus, in Jurassic Park, dinosaurs
(the flagship species of palaeontology) have become experimental animals and
palaeontology itself, the study of extinct life, is transformed overnight into an





































experimental discipline. Excavations are no longer needed. When Alan Grant, an
outstanding palaeontologist brought in to assess the safety of the resort, is con-
fronted with living versions of his favourite organisms, he immediately realises
the epistemological significance of this event. Palaeontological quandaries that
occupied his mind for years, such as the issue of whether dinosaurs were warm-
blooded and caring animals, are now easily resolved by merely looking at these
‘surprisingly active’ organisms:
Grant’s field of study was going to change instantly. The palaeontologi-
cal study of dinosaurs was finished. The whole enterprise—the museum
halls with their giant skeletons and flocks of echoing school children, the
university laboratories with their bone trays, the research papers, the
journals—all of it was going to end. (Crichton, 1991, p. 84).
The revivification of vanished life forms, based on a reconstruction of their
genomes, is less absurd than it may appear at first glance: the idea has inspired
serious research efforts—although most of them are directed at bringing back
Holocene or Pleistocene species (such as mammoths discovered in Siberian per-
mafrost). Notwithstanding a certain tendency towards exaggeration, Michael
Crichton, a Harvard graduate, tends to be well-informed when it comes to con-
temporary laboratory life and cutting-edge research in the genomics era. His
novels are usually well documented and based on substantial research. He is au
courant with the latest developments in American (notably West Coast) science.
His novels may be regarded as ‘scenario studies’.
In one of his essays, Stephen Jay Gould (1996) submitted Jurassic Park to a
critical assessment. Although it fails the test in terms of scientific scrutiny, this
does not make the work completely nonsensical, says Gould. DNA is not a geo-
logically stable compound and even if bits and pieces of dinosaur DNA could
be sequenced, he argues, it is unthinkable that the geological record would
somehow have managed to preserve the complete genetic program of an organ-
ism. In Crichton’s novel, computational biology is called in to fill in the gaps
with the help of frog genes but, as Gould emphasises, this whole idea evolves
out of a ‘deterministic’ and ‘reductionistic’ prejudice. It will never be possible
to make an organism from just a few percent of its codes. Indeed:
An amalgamated code of, say, 80 percent dinosaur DNA and 20 percent
frog DNA could never direct the embryological development of a
functioning organism. This form of reductionism is silly. An animal is
an integrated entity, not the summation of its genes (Gould, 1996,
p. 227).
To a certain extent, however, this is acknowledged by Crichton himself.
Although in his novel it is possible to bring extinguished species back to life
again, using paleo-DNA as their ‘blueprint’, the novel eventually incites its
readers to question a genetic deterministic view on life. In the end, the novel
demonstrates how such an adventure, based on a deterministic understanding
of life, will inevitably go wrong. First of all, animals become ill, suffering from





































the effects of exposure to a post-Jurassic environment. But before long, other
things go wrong as well. Notwithstanding its initial reductionism, the novel’s
moral message is that we should not underestimate the complexity of life.
In the novel, a mathematician is added to the list of characters to play the role of
critical referee. It is no coincidence that complexity is his favourite subject. From
the outset, he is overtly sceptical about the experiment and challenges its determi-
nistic premises. His arguments are borrowed from chaos theory. Enterprises such
as this will never go as planned, he claims. Their course will prove unpredictable.
Complex sequences of events will never proceed as they are expected to. Sooner or
later, something will get out of control and the enterprise will lead to completely
different results than was foreseen by those who designed it. Notably, containment
will prove impossible. Life (and this goes for revivified Jurassic life as well) has the
inherent tendency to spread, to disseminate. The project has taken its precau-
tions, but they rely on a deterministic logic. A gene was inserted so that the
animals would be unable to manufacture the amino acid lysine. It had to be admi-
nistered to them and for that reason they were supposed to be unable to survive in
the outside world. But Malcolm’s prophecies come true. Dinosaurs do manage to
escape from the resort, satisfying their want of lysine in unexpected ways, thereby
endangering the ill-prepared outside world. At the beginning of the novel, they
have already entered the world of normal people, already left the experimental
premises from which they originated. Thus eventually, the novel challenges
rather than endorses genetic determinism.
Reframing the debate
Genetic determinism has gained substantial popularity in the public sphere,
through metaphors such as the genome as ‘blueprint’ and the ‘hunt’ for genes.
According to critics, such as Dorothy Nelkin and Susan Lindee (1995), these
metaphors encourage a deterministic interpretation of genetics, inciting discrimi-
natory effects throughout society.11 Gene talk in mass media is thought to
strengthen a reductionistic understanding of our genome, biologically determinis-
tic and socially discriminatory, equating human beings with their genes
(Lippman, 1992). Although these concerns may have sounded plausible some
years ago, we must now acknowledge that they are actually outdated. The impli-
cation is that public debate as it has evolved in recent years is not yet addressing
the challenges and concerns that will really be generated by genomics. In other
words, the agenda for public debate needs to be updated. Otherwise, it may
loose much of its critical potential.
On the basis of an epistemological analysis of genomics research, the conclusion
must indeed be that it is time for the agenda of public debate to be reset in a differ-
ent direction. The epistemological shift that is inherent in the transformation of
genetics to genomics should also affect the agenda of public discussion and
policy development. Current debates are to a large extent still addressing
themes that were popular in the 1990s, doing so in the vocabularies of the
1990s, reflecting the logic of genetic determinism. If we want to take genomics





































seriously, it is time to try to move the debate into the 21st century. The focus of
attention should therefore move from issues such as ‘genetic modification’ and
similar discussions, focusing on single genes, to issues involved in the use of and
understanding of large-scale genomics information.
On the level of healthcare, for example, the focus should no longer be on issues
involved in screening for monogenetic (and therefore rare) health disorders, pro-
viding information for specific target groups and individuals at risk. Rather, the
focus should be on the challenges involved in research on multi-factorial (and
usually much more common) health problems, generating information that will
be relevant for virtually everyone. In theory, genomics information may
empower individuals to manage their own health conditions through preven-
tion—gearing diet, lifestyle, professional career, etc., to their genetic profile.
But will individuals be willing and able to use these new forms of information?
Will new types of intermediaries and consultants emerge to assist them in their
choices? And who will have access to and be able to use this information? Will
genomics research really empower individuals to manage their own life, or will
it rather encourage top-down forms of exclusion and discrimination, for
example by employers and insurance companies? These are the issues to be
addressed, on the basis of a recognition that genomics information will be
different in important respects to other types of health information.
I find it not realistic to believe that the Olympics of the future will be dominated
by ‘genetically modified athletes’ (Miah, 2004). It is much more likely that they
will be dominated by genetically ‘normal’ athletes working in close collaboration
with teams of experts who know how to make use of genomics information in the
context of diets, training programs, nutritional supplements (‘nutriceuticals’) and
‘genetic doping’. Or, to use another example, the 21st century will not be a ‘brave
new world’ where ‘super employees’ will be artificially produced by means of
genetic modification. What is much more likely is that in the near future,
various possibilities for pre-employment genetic screening (PEGS) will affect
the course of professional careers. We must start thinking, in an anticipatory
manner, how we are going to address these issues, how we may use these possibi-
lities in fair and legitimate ways. Genomics will be about the equitable and intel-
ligent use of complex information, rather than about manipulation. In order to
address these challenges, it is important to move the public and policy debate
beyond the restricted stereotypes of genetic determinism (its promises and
fears). ELSA genomics should not be about genetic modification of humans,
but rather about how to govern the use (storage, management, access, and
interpretation) of genomics information in a transparent and justifiable manner.
Francis Fukuyama (2002) has depicted transhumanism as a major threat to
human culture. He proposes to determine the unique genetic human constitution
(our ‘Factor X’) as something to be preserved. According to Fukuyama (2002,
p. 171), there is a genetic endowment that allows us to become human, dis-
tinguishing human beings ‘in essence from other types of creatures’. Obviously,
both transhumanism and its critics (such as Fukuyama) start from the same
idea: that we apparently are our genes, and that we can modify ourselves (for





































better or for worse) by adding, deleting or preserving genes. If there is something
we can learn from genomics research and the HGP it is that the causal trajectories
from genes to traits are generally speaking much too complex for such scenarios to
be credible. Information governance, rather than gene-based anthropotechnolo-
gies, will become the core issue—as policy strategies will increasingly be informed
by the outcomes of genomics research.
Notes
1. See ,http://www.genome.gov/10001356..
2. For a critical analysis of the blueprint metaphor (among others), see Nelkin and Lindee
(1995).
3. Cf. Kevles (1985). The term eugenics was introduced in 1883 by Francis Galton. Eugenics
had been ‘waiting’ for genetics, so to speak and (in the early decades of the 20th century)
was eager to put it to use.
4. Loeb’s work was well-known whenHuxley wrote his novel. It was described for example in the
biological text book, The Science of Life, written by H.G. Wells in collaboration with his son
(G.P. Wells) and Julian Huxley (brother of Aldous). The authors ask themselves for
example whether artificial reproduction will also be possible in ‘mammals’ (humans)—
’There is no reason to suppose that it is not...’ (Wells, Huxley & Wells, 1931/1938, p. 509).
5. ‘[T]he human genome seems to encode only 20,000–25,000 protein-coding genes’ (van
Ommen, 2005, p. 931), ‘ On the basis of available evidence, our best estimate is that the
total number of protein-coding genes is in the range 20,000–25,000’).
6. See Nature Biotechnology, 1999 (1), p. 511.
7. See Science, 2001, p. 1153.
8. See Nature, 2001, p. 813.
9. See Genomics, 1997, 45: 244–9.
10. See ,http://www.genomics.nl/homepage/research/innovative_clusters/ecogenomics/..
11. Others have raised serious doubts about this line of reasoning, notably, C. Condit (1999).
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